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Case Comment
The Derivative Use of Attorneys' Opinion Work
Product in IRS Summons Enforcement
Proceedings: United States v. Bonnell
In February, 1977, a Minneapolis trial attorney met with a
tax attorney and others associated with Cargill, Inc. to discuss
possible tax litigation concerning foreign payments made by
Cargill subsidiaries. Following the meeting, the trial attorney
summarized his notes and made arrangements with a messen-
ger service to deliver the typewritten memorandum to Cargill's
general counsel. Without authority, the messenger photo-
copied the document and delivered copies to a local newspaper
and to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).1 Based on informa-
tion found in the document, the IRS issued tax summonses to
Cargill2 and subsequently commenced an action in United
States District Court for their enforcement.3 The court found
that the document was an attorney's opinion work product 4
1. United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1070, 1073-74 (D. Minn. 1979).
2. Issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976), the summonses required
that certain documents be produced and that testimony be given by an assis-
tant vice-president of Cargill, Inc. and by a partner in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., Cargill's certified public accountants. 483 F. Supp. at 1073.
3. To compel compliance with a summons, the IRS must bring an enforce-
ment action in a federal district court. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a) (1976). See
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 52 (1964). Such an enforcement action is
"an adversary proceeding affording a judicial determination of the challenges to
the summons and giving complete protection to the witness." Reisman v. Cap-
lin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964). Provisions for judicial enforcement of IRS sum-
monses thus stand as the principal restraints against abuse of the summons
procedure. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975). See also
Comment, Constraints on the Administrative Summons Power of the Internal
Revenue Service, 63 IowA L. REV. 526, 529 (1977).
4. "Work product" generally refers to any notes or materials relating to
the facts or substance of a case, prepared by an attorney in reasonable antici-
pation of litigation. Wigmore suggests that the work product doctrine devel-
oped from the same common law origin as did the attorney-client privilege. See
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2318 (McNaugton rev. ed. 1961). The term "Work
product" had its origin in 1945 when the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
hesitatingly referred to "work product of the lawyer" as something not required
to be disclosed in the course of pretrial discovery. See Hickman v. Taylor, 153
F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The
Supreme Court subsequently employed the term in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
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that had been obtained without authorization, but nonetheless
rejected Cargill's arguments for the application of a protective
exclusionary rule,5 holding that, in a tax summons enforcement
proceeding, the derivative use of improperly obtained work
product will be allowed when the IRS acquires the work prod-
uct from a private source. United States v. Bonnell, 483 F.
Supp. 1070 (D. Minn. 1979).
The exclusionary rule prevents illegally obtained material
from being admitted into evidence against those whose rights
have been violated.6 Originally designed to implement protec-
tions provided by the fourth amendment,7 the judicially created
rule has been applied to suppress not only illegally seized pri-
495, 511 (1947), and the concept has since been partially codified at FED. R. Cry.
P. 26(b) (3). See notes 16-27 infra and accompanying text.
5. Cargill resisted the enforcement of the summonses on numerous
grounds, but argued primarily that the IRS' use of work product to develop
other, unprivileged evidence, would effectively undermine the protections af-
forded work product. Underlying Cargill's argument was the contention that,
like the exclusionary rule in the fourth amendment search-and-seizure context,
see notes 6-13 infra and accompanying text, a protective exclusionary rule in
the context of a summons enforcement proceeding would properly effectuate
the policies of the work product doctrine. See United States v. Bonnell, 483 F.
Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Minn. 1979).
6. In the landmark case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the
Supreme Court determined that suppression of evidence is an appropriate tool
to protect the guarantees of the fourth amendment and established what has
become known as the exclusionary rule. The controversial Weeks holding ap-
plied only to federal prosecutions; not until 1961 was the exclusionary rule ex-
tended to apply to actions by state officials. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
The rather significant length of time from the rule's promulgation in Weeks
to its extension in Mapp can be explained, in part, by a continuing lack of con-
sensus among the Supreme Court justices regarding the efficacy of the exclu-
sionary rule in general. As Justice Blackmun observed in United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976), "[t]he debate within the Court on the exclusion-
ary rule has always been a warm one." The present Court is still wrestling with
the basic issue of the need for an exclusionary rule, and a number of observers
believe that the Court is on the verge of restricting the scope of the rule's appli-
cation by adopting an exception for evidence obtained by government agents
acting under a reasonable, good-faith belief that their conduct comports with
existing law. See generally Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The
"Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CPM. L & CRIMINOLOGY
635 (1978); Note, Impending "Frontal Assault" on the Citadek The Supreme
Court's Readiness to Modi fy the Strict Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amend-
ment to a Good Faith Standard, 12 TULSA L REV. 337 (1976). See also United
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (good faith exception to exclu-
sionary rule adopted).
7. In establishing the exclusionary rule as the appropriate remedy for
fourth amendment violations the Supreme Court observed that if unlawfully
seized evidence is not suppressed "the protection of the Fourth Amendment
... might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). Exclusionary rules have subsequently been applied
outside the fourth amendment search-and-seizure context. See note 14 infra.
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mary evidence, but also any secondary evidence derived from
such primary evidence-so-called 'fruit of the poisonous tree."8
Because the suppression of evidence impedes the truth-seeking
process,9 the exclusionary rule is viewed as a drastic remedy.
Reassessing the propriety of applying such a severe sanction,
the Supreme Court has recently begun to restrict the scope of
the rule's operation.10 In United States v. Calandra," for ex-
ample, the Court refused to extend the rule's application in the
context of a grand jury investigation. The Court held that a
grand jury witness could not refuse to answer questions on the
ground that such questions were based on evidence obtained
8. First coined by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939), the phrase 'fruit of the poisonous tree" refers to evidence
obtained through the use of illegally seized primary evidence. This well-estab-
lished fourth amendment doctrine generally determines the limits of the exclu-
sionary rule in the trial setting. See generally Pitler, 'The Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (1968).
9. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976); Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 m-N. L. REV. 349, 429 (1974).
10. The Burger Court has demonstrated its disfavor of the application of
exclusionary rules by limiting the areas to which such rules are applicable and
by narrowing the range of defendants entitled to invoke them. See, e.g., United
States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980) (refusal to allow a federal district court's
use of its supervisory power to exclude evidence seized unlawfully from a third
party not before the court); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (exclu-
sionary rule held inapplicable despite a judicial determination that the munici-
pal ordinance under which the search was conducted was unconstitutionally
vague); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (exclusionary rule held inapplicable
in federal habeus corpus review of state convictions); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule held inapplicable to an IRS assessment
proceeding where the illegal search had been conducted by state law enforce-
ment agents); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (refusal to extend the
exclusionary rule retroactively in cases in which law enforcement agents have
acted in good faith). See generally note 6 supra.
In each of these decisions the Court critically examined the deterrence pol-
icies underlying the exclusionary rule, see note 35 infra, and refused to sup-
press evidence when these policies were not furthered. Unable to develop a
consensus on the fundamental rationale for the rule, the Burger Court's ap-
proaches have been markedly inconsistent. The confusion thus created has
generated both concern and criticism. See, e.g., Burkoff, The Court that De-
voured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary
Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 190-91 (1979); Schlesinger & Wilson, Property, Pri-
vacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DUQ.
L. REv. 225, 227 (1980).
11. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The grand jury in Calandra, investigating illegal
loansharking activities, subpoenaed a witness to ask him questions regarding
records that had been illegally seized by government agents during a search of
the witness' place of business. Id. at 341. Both the district court, in In re Ca-
landra, 332 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ohio 1971), and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972), held for
the witness, suppressing both the evidence and its "fruit." 465 F.2d at 1227; 332
F. Supp. at 746.
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from an unlawful search and seizure. 12 The Calandra Court
reasoned that since a grand jury does not adjudicate, but
merely investigates to determine probable cause, it should re-
main free from some of the evidentiary and procedural restric-
tions otherwise applicable at trial.13
Although originally conceived as a remedy for fourth
amendment violations, exclusionary rules have also been used
as remedies for statutory and procedural violations.14 In deter-
mining whether an exclusionary rule is appropriate in any
given proceeding, courts have often employed a balancing test:
weighing the nature of the proceeding and the necessity for the
information against the values to be fostered by an order
preventing disclosure.' 5 Thus, the privileged status of any dis-
12. 414 U.s. at 354.
13. The Court stated:
It is evident that this extension of the exclusionary rule would seri-
ously impede the grand jury. Because the grand jury does not finally
adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pur-
sue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evi-
dentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial.
Id. at 349. The Calandra Court's decision to restrict the scope of the exclusion-
ary rule may have been made easier, however, because the subject evidence
was not privileged. See id. at 353-54.
14. As the Supreme Court has stated: "While the general common-law
practice is to admit evidence despite its illegal origins, this Court in a number
of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has
been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal
statutes, or federal rules of procedure." United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255
(1966) (citations omitted). More specifically, the exclusionary rule has been
used to suppress evidence gained through abuse of the IRS summons process,
see United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 307 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 928 (1979), and a number of courts have found that suppression is a theo-
retically proper safeguard against governmental abuse of the Internal Revenue
Code. See, e.g., United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 813-14 (3d Cir. 1979) (rem-
edy of suppression available when the IRS' investigative authority is not re-
stricted to non-criminal purposes); United States v. Di Orio, 484 F. Supp. 22, 25
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (remedy of suppression available to claimant who can meet
burden of showing that IRS summons was issued in bad faith); United States v.
Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (suppression remedy available when
an IRS summons is being used for the improper purpose of investigating only
criminal behavior); In re Leonardo, 208 F. Supp. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (rem-
edy of supression available to taxpayers claiming violation of LR.C. § 7605(b)
(1958), irrespective of coincidental constitutional violations).
15. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-95 (1976); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974). The Bonnell court stated that if an exclusion-
ary rule were applied "a substantial cost would be imposed on the societal in-
terest in enforcement of the nation's revenue laws." 483 F. Supp. at 1082. The
court's use of a balancing test rather than a fixed fourth amendment standard
is consistent with recent Supreme Court exclusionary rule cases in which the
Court balanced the individual's interest in personal liberty or privacy against
the governmental interest served by the search or seizure. See, e.g., 428 U.S. at
492-95; 414 U.S. at 349.
The Burger Court's recent balancing approach to exclusionary rule claims
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puted evidence has been a significant consideration in the re-
view of claims for its suppression.
Attorneys' opinion work product enjoys a privileged status
that some courts have recognized as a valid ground upon which
to refuse either a grand jury subpoena 16 or an IRS summons.17
Recognized initially in the context of civil discovery, the work
product doctrine now is applied in both civil and criminal pro-
ceedings' 8 to protect materials developed by an attorney "in
the course of preparation for possible litigation."' 9 The privi-
leged status afforded opinion work product stems from a recog-
nition that an adversarial system of justice functions best when
lawyers work with a certain degree of privacy, preparing legal
theories and strategies free from the demoralizing apprehen-
sion that sensitive files and notes can be revealed to opposing
parties. 20 Because the work product doctrine safeguards law-
yers' notes and mental impressions against disclosure, it en-
sures that attorneys are not inhibited in their representation of
clients, and that clients are not reluctant to disclose all facts,
favorable and unfavorable, to their counsel.21 The doctrine also
has resulted consistently in the balance being struck in favor of the govern-
mental interest. Apparently, the Court intends to further restrict the scope of
the exclusionary rule's application by using this balancing approach. See
Burkoff, supra note 10, at 158-59.
16. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1228 (3d Cir.
1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings [Duffy], 473 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 484 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
17. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4096-97 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1981); United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 987 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420, 430 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd 478 F.2d 1038,
1041 (7th Cir. 1973).
18. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975).
19. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947). See also FED. R. Cirv. P.
26(b) (3), adopted by the Supreme Court in 1970, which codifies that aspect of
Hickman and its progeny relating to "ordinary" or "Materials" work product.
See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
20. As the Supreme Court stated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947),
"[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted in-
quiries into the 'files and mental impressions of an attorney." Id. at 510. See
note 21 infra.
21. Although compelling, the policy considerations underlying the work
product doctrine are largely intangible and subtle, and efforts to establish a
jusitification for the privilege must be made by reference to policy goals that
are only vaguely defined. As Judge Goodrich suggezts in the circuit court opin-
ion of Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1945), aff'd on other grounds, 329
U.S. 495 (1947):
Those members of the public who have matters to be settled through
lawyers and through litigation should be free to make full disclosure to
their advisers and to have those advisers and other persons concerned
in the litigation free to put their whole-souled efforts into the business
[Vol. 65:488
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ensures vigorous, independent preparation on the part of op-
posing counsel.22 If the immunity of opinion work product
were not vigorously protected, "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal
advice and in the preparation of cases for trial."2 3 Work prod-
uct protection thus plays an important role in maintaining the
integrity of the adversary system.24
Although the parameters of the work product doctrine are
while it is carried on. The soundness of this policy is not capable of
laboratory demonstration.... We believe it is sound policy; we know
that it is irrefutably established in the law.
153 F.2d at 223 (footnotes omitted). For a useful survey of the policy goals that
the work product doctrine is designed to promote, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). See also Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attor-
ney-Client Privilege: Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery
(pt. II), 42 U. DET. L.J. 253, 268-82 (1965).
22. Traditionally, the lawyer's role as an advocate and the resulting duty of
loyalty to his or her client, were viewed as predominant features of the adver-
sary system. See F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 4-5 (2d ed.
1977). This perception of the adversary system is changing, however, and the
current view concerning the attorney's proper role in litigation places more em-
phasis on the attorney's role as an officer of the court and less emphasis on his
or her role as an independent advocate. See Patterson, An Analysis of the Pro-
posed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 31 MERCER I- REV. 645, 665 (1980).
Motivated at least in part by crowded court dockets, the drafters proposed new
standards of professional conduct aimed at discouraging delay tactics, spurious
claims, and false evidence. See ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.1 (discussion
draft 1980). These proposed rules impose a duty upon the advocate to be "hon-
est" in litigation, but nonetheless support the essential feature of the adversary
system: "the advocate's duty in the adversary system is to present the client's
case as persuasively as possible, leaving presentation of the opposing case to
the other party." Id. at Rule 3. The advocate's ability to perform this duty
would be severely threatened if opposing parties were allowed access to, or use
of, the attorney's thoughts and legal strategies prepared in anticipation of liti-
gation. The protection of opinion work product thus remains an essential fea-
ture of a properly functioning adversary system.
23. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
24. By helping to protect independent litigants in the uninhibited prosecu-
tion of their claims, the privileged status of opinion work product is of great im-
portance to the proper functioning of the adversary system. As the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained:
We know that our adversary system of justice relies heavily on the
attorneys for its very functioning.... In every instance in which an
attorney is consulted ... he must be free to give his candid, dispas-
sionate opinion, and equally free to record it and his mental impres-
sions and conclusions. No other rule is compatible with the interests of
justice. The client seeking the opinion must be similarly uninhib-
ited.... The restriction on the attorney in giving advice, and the inhi-
bition on the client in seeking it, is simply not compatible with our
adversary system.
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 735-6 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
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still largely undeveloped,25 it is clear that the general concept
encompasses two distinct types of work product: "opinion,"
comprising an attorney's thoughts and strategies, and "ordi-
nary," encompassing other factual material gathered by the at-
torney. Opinion work product enjoys nearly absolute
protection, but ordinary work product receives only conditional
protection.2 6 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect this
distinction by shielding opinion work product from discovery,
but allowing limited access to ordinary work product.2 7
The district court in Bonnell accepted the questioned docu-
ment as an attorney's opinion work product,28 finding it to be "a
personal recollection or memorandum" prepared in reasonable
anticipation of litigation and containing the mental impressions
of an attorney. 29 The court did not, however, acknowledge any
contradiction between its statement that "an assertion of the
work-product doctrine would have been a valid defense had the
summonses required production of the questioned document
itself,"30 and its holding that the IRS should not be barred from
using work product to obtain other, unprivileged materials.
The Bonnell court gave four reasons supporting its refusal
25. The previous split of authority among the circuit courts of appeals on
the issue of the applicability of work product defenses to IRS summonses is an
example of the ongoing development of the work product doctrine. See note 60
infra and accompanying text.
26. See generally Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REv. 333 (1978). The court in Bonnell
recognized the common distinction between "opinion" and "ordinary" work
product. 483 F. Supp. at 1078. Although this distinction can be decisive on is-
sues involving the scope of pretrial discovery under FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3),
the court in Bonnell found it was not determinative on the issue before the
court.
27. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3), Advisory Comm. Note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499-
502 (1970). Rule 26(b) (3) provides in part:
(3) Trial preparation: materials.... A party may obtain discov-
ery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's repre-
sentative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, in-
surer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3) (emphasis added).
28. 483 F. Supp. at 1078.
29. Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir.
1973)).
30. 483 F. Supp. at 1079.
[Vol. 65:488
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to apply a work product fruits exclusionary rule in the IRS
summons enforcement proceeding. Initially, the court noted
that because the IRS was conducting an administrative investi-
gation, its power to investigate was not limited by potential re-
strictions upon the admissibility of the evidence at trial. The
court reasoned that such restrictions at trial provide adequate
protection against the misuse of privileged material.3' The
court then drew an analogy between IRS summons proceedings
and grand jury investigations, 32 citing United States v. Calan-
dra,33 which permitted derivative use of unlawfully obtained
evidence in a grand jury proceeding, as "the controlling case."34
The court suggested that in the present case, disallowing IRS
use of the private document would not further the policies 35
underlying exclusionary rules. Finally, the court noted the gen-
eral judicial aversion to rules sanctioning the suppression of
31. Id. at 1079-80.
32. There are many shared characteristics between IRS proceedings and
grand jury probes. As the Bonnell court notes, the grounds on which an admin-
istrative summons and a grand jury subpoena are issued are essentially the
same. See 483 F. Supp. at 1080 (citing United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F.2d 249,
252 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977)). Moreover, the grounds for challenging an IRS sum-
mons, see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 526 (1971), are quite similar
to the grounds for challenging a grand jury subpoena, see United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973). See 483 F. Supp. at 1080. Both procedures also
interpose a neutral tribunal between the investigating agency and the subject
in order to help prevent abuses. Because of these similarities, other courts
have drawn the summons proceeding/grand jury investigation analogy. See
cases cited in Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. at 1080. But see notes 45-50 infra and ac-
companying text.
33. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See notes 11-13 supra , 45-53 infra, and accompany-
ing text.
34. 483 F. Supp. at 1080.
35. The Bonnell court considered deterrence to be the "prime policy of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule." Id. at 1081. When originally conceived,
however, the most widely recognized policy underlying the exclusionary rule
was that of judicial integrity. This rationale was first clearly articulated in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928). Brandeis proposed that "[wihen the Government, having full
knowledge, [seeks] ... to avail itself of the fruits of [illegal searches and
seizures] in order to accomplish its own ends, it assume [s] moral responsibil-
ity for the officers' crimes." Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Although often
repeated over the years, this "imperative of judicial integrity," Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960), gradually fell into disfavor. Increasingly, courts
began to focus instead on the exclusionary rule's deterrent value. See Com-
ment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the
Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L REv. 1129, 1130, 1142-43 (1973).
Thus, the Bonnell court's emphasis on the deterrant effect of the exclusionary
rule, see note 71 infra and accompanying text, is consistent with the current
view of a majority of Supreme Court justices. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347 (1974).
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evidence,3 6 and found that in the instant case "the summonses
[would] likely result in reliable evidence."37 The court thus
concluded that the societal interest in the enforcement of the
nation's revenue laws outweighed any effect that enforcement
of the summonses would have on the scope of the work product
doctrine.38
The Bonnell decision is based primarily on Supreme Court
cases evidencing disfavor toward exclusionary rules, but there
are problems with the court's analysis. First, the court rejected
the position of United States v. Bank of Commerce,3 9 in which
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disallowed the use of
the "fruit" of unlawfully seized evidence in the context of IRS
summons enforcement proceedings. 40 Although Bank of Com-
merce is a fourth amendment case in which an unauthorized
seizure was instigated by government agents and not by a third
party, the Bonnell court erred in supporting its dismissal of the
case 4' solely on the basis of recent Supreme Court exclusion-
ary rule decisions. The Bonnell court also summarily rejected
other cases cited by Cargill on the ground that they "were
handed down prior to the Supreme Court's more careful tailor-
ing of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,"42 but failed
to cite specific decisions to support this assertion. Although
the Supreme Court has begun to reject attempts to extend the
scope of exclusionary rules outside the context of criminal tri-
36. "Exclusionary rules are receiving mounting criticism from judges and
scholars because they undermine the truth-seeking process." 483 F. Supp. at
1082.
37. Id. While undoubtedly true, this argument is hardly persuasive, for
probative evidence invariably is suppressed whenever exclusionary rules are
invoked to protect privileged material.
38. Id.
39. 405 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1969). In Bank of Commerce the IRS sought en-
forcement of tax summonses for records that had been called to the attention
of the IRS by data that allegedly had been obtained illegally by IRS agents.
The defendant taxpayer sought to prevent the production of the summoned
bank records on the ground that they were the fruit of an illegal search and
seizure and that their disclosure would thus violate his fourth amendment
rights. The court refused to enforce the IRS summons because district court
consideration of the fourth amendment claim was absent. Id. at 933-35.
40. Admittedly, the traditional deterrence rationale of discouraging illegal
government searches is missing in Bonnell. See note 71 infra and accompany-
ing text. But see note 55 infra.
41. "Bank of Commerce is no longer good law in light of Supreme Court
exclusionary rule cases since 1969." 483 F. Supp. at 1082.
42. Id. at 1082 n.22. The court also rejected cases on the basis of their be-
ing either "criminal cases" or cases "contain[ing] no discussion of the rationale
for suppression of fruits." Id.
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als,43 there is no foundation for the Bonnell court's suggestion
that the exclusionary rule recently has been restricted in the
context of work product defenses to administrative sum-
monses.44
Several difficulties are also presented by the Bonnell
court's analogy of IRS administrative investigations to grand
jury proceedings such as those in United States v. Calandra.45
Although some courts have employed this type of analogy in
the context of administrative investigations, 46 it is clear that
the IRS' function to both investigate and prosecute revenue
law violations is different from the grand jury's solely investiga-
tive role. Moreover, the historical and constitutional founda-
tions that underlie these respective functions are distinct.4 7
The grand jury was developed to prevent investigative
abuses-providing a safeguard between the individual and the
imposing power of the state.48 As an arm of the executive and
a party to the investigation, the IRS is far from an impartial in-
quisitor.49 These basic differences between grand jury investi-
gations and IRS summons procedures suggest that it is
inappropriate to extend to the IRS the grand jury's broad pow-
ers of inquisition solely on the ground that the two agencies are
performing similar functions.50
43. See Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Cour, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1403 (1977).
44. Although recent Supreme Court decisions appear to establish a signifi-
cant trend toward limiting the areas to which exclusionary rules may be ap-
plied, see notes 6 & 10 supra, the Court's effort is far from "carefully tailored."
Rather, the Court's recent decisions reflect a marked lack of consensus and, as
a result, fourth amendment doctrine has been characterized as "unstable and
unconvincing." Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L.
REV. 47, 49 (1974); see Burkoff, supra note 10, at 192.
45. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
46. For example, in United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975), the
Supreme Court examined the broad scope of the investigatory power of the
IRS and compared it to the scope of the power of a grand jury that can investi-
gate without cause "merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even
just because it wants assurance that it is not." Id. at 148 (quoting United States
v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964)). See also cases cited by the Bonnell court, 483
F. Supp. at 1080.
47. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 537-40 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Comment, supra note 3, at 534.
48. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Although the grand
jury's theoretical role is that of a neutral investigator, in practice its role has
been abused. See generally Rodis, A Lawyer's Guide to Grand Jury Abuse, 14
CRim. L. Bum. 123 (1978). Such abuse, however, does not eliminate the theoret-
ical distinction between its role and that of the IRS.
49. See Comment, supra note 3, at 534.
50. See Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering: An Ap-
praisal of the Investigative Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. IN-
DUS. & COM. L. REV. 657, 708-09 (1965).
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The Bonnell court's reliance on Calandra is also un-
founded in light of the radical difference in the type of evidence
involved in the two cases. Calandra did not involve work prod-
uct or any other privileged material.5 1 Indeed, the Court in Ca-
landra specifically noted that a grand jury may not violate a
valid privilege.52 If the evidence in Calandra had been derived
from illegally seized attorney's opinion work product, it is not
clear that the Calandra Court would still have rejected the mo-
tion to suppress. Thus, Calandra provides only questionable
precedent for the holding in Bonnell.5 3
More fundamentally, the Bonnell court failed to articulate
the policy considerations underlying its willingness to allow the
subsequent use of opinion work product illegally seized by a
private party. The court correctly noted that an unauthorized
private seizure resulting in evidence being transferred to the
government does not violate the fourth amendment,5 4 but the
court failed to discuss whether the government's subsequent,
expanded use of that evidence implicates other protectable in-
terests. Although no court has yet adopted the view that the
government's subsequent use of privately seized evidence to
gain derivative evidence implicates fourth amendment inter-
ests, such use arguably constitutes an independent governmen-
tal search that infringes upon fourth amendment interests.5 5
Merely because privileged material was privately seized should
not give the IRS a license to invade further a privileged area.
51. See note 11 supra.
52. 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
53. Because the work product doctrine is firmly established as a common
law privilege and many courts have applied it to protect evidence in grand jury
proceedings, see note 16 supra, the Bonnell court's reliance on Calandra is less
than persuasive.
54. 483 F. Supp. at 1076. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921).
See also Coolidge v. New Hamphsire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
55. See Comment, United States v. Roberts-Private Search and Seizure-
Expectations of Privacy Have Gone to "Pot " 25 S.D. L REv. 403, 407-10 (1980).
Cf. United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1976) (government's
acceptance of privately-seized first amendment materials constituted a search
that must be analyzed under fourth amendment principles), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 820 (1976); United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1375 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976)
(FBI examination of materials in possession of UPS considered unreasonable
search and seizure). But see United States v. Roberts, No. 79-1396 (8th Cir.,
filed Nov. 13, 1979) (refusing to extend fourth amendment protection to pri-
vately seized marijuana). Arguably, work product deserves such extended pro-
tection because of the policies underlying the work product doctrine. See text
accompanying notes 20-24 supra. As the Supreme Court recently stated 'The
notion that private searches insulate from Fourth Amendment scrutiny subse-
quent governmental searches of the same or lesser scope is inconsistent with
traditional Fourth Amendment principles." Walter v. United States, 100 S. Ct.
2395, 2403 (1980) (White, J., concurring).
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Of course, a third party seizure of the type that occurred in
Bonnell is a rare event. Nevertheless, in assessing the effect of
an unauthorized seizure of opinion work product with refer-
ence to the policies that the work product doctrine is designed
to promote, it is of little consequence that the initial seizure
was made by a third party.56 Of overriding importance is the
fact that the opinion work product wa obtained by an adverse
party. By permitting an adverse party's free use of its oppo-
nent's mental impressions and legal theories, the Bonnell court
allowed one party to rely on its opponent's presumptively confi-
dential trial preparations, and the court thus impeded the at-
tainment of the goals of the adversary system.5 7 The court's
willingness to allow derivative use of opinion work product on
the ground that the privileged material had been initially
seized by a third party was therefore incompatible with the un-
derlying policies of the work product privilege.5 8 If opinion
work product is to be properly protected, both the work prod-
uct itself and any information derived from it must be consist-
ently and constantly protected. Such protection should be
denied only in the face of clearly superior policy goals.59
56. Of course, whether the seizure was made by private or by governmen-
tal parties is a question central to the determination of whether the deterrence
rationale for the exclusionary rule applies in the given situation. See note 71
infra.
57. In describing the specific ways in which a party's use of his or her op-
ponent's opinion work product impairs the adversary system, one commentator
explains that in the context of pre-trial discovery
[p]ermitting discovery of opinion work product frustrates the adver-
sary system in several ways. First, if opinion work product were freely
discoverable, a lawyer could rely on the work and thoughts of his oppo-
nent, the prospect of which could discourage the opponent from exert-
ing his own best efforts. Second, knowing that his opinion work
product could be discovered, a lawyer might refrain from written prep-
aration. This would result in work of poor quality, injuring the inter-
ests of the client. Third, allowing discovery would cause a decline in
the morale of the legal profession ....
Note, supra note 26, at 335 (footnotes omitted).
58. Similarly, the Bonnell court showed a marked insensitivity to the pol-
icy considerations underlying the privileged status of opinion work product
when it suggested that the privileged material would be sufficiently protected
through suppression at a subsequent trial. 483 F. Supp. at 1080; see text accom-
panying note 31 supra. Here again, the fact of overriding importance is that the
court did allow the opinion work product to be used by an opposing party.
Once opinion work product is exploited, the policies that support its protection
have been lost, and the question of when the opinion work product is used is of
relatively little consequence. The compelling policy considerations underlying
the privilege apply with full force whenever one party seeks to exploit an oppo-
nent's opinion work product, regardless of the stage of the proceeding. To be
fulfilled, these policy considerations require the certainty that only consistent
protective treatment can provide.
59. A number of courts have recognized limited exceptions to the absolute
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The Supreme Court recently held that the work product
doctrine does apply to IRS summonses, 6 0 but failed to an-
nounce a standard for determining when the government has
made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the protec-
tion of the doctrine.61 The question to be addressed, then, is
how far the opinion work product doctrine will extend in the
context of an IRS administrative investigation. Because it
raises very basic issues concerning the function of the work
product doctrine and the scope of the IRS' summons authority,
this question requires the consideration of competing policies-
the government's interest in enforcing revenue laws and the in-
dividual's interest in the integrity of his or her attorney's prep-
aration.62
At the outset, it must be conceded that a broad investiga-
tive power is necessary if the IRS is to fulfill its mission prop-
erly. Vigorous enforcement of the federal revenue laws is
necessary to maintain the laws' effectiveness and integrity.
Recognizing this, Congress has granted the IRS Commissioner
broad statutory authority to engage freely in wide-ranging in-
immunity of opinion work product when the need for production was unusually
compelling. Included have been a crime or fraud exception, which permits the
discovery of opinion work product prepared to facilitate a client's criminal or
fraudulent activities, and an "at issue" exception, which permits discovery
when only the opinion work product can provide direct proof on a principal is-
sue. See Note, supra note 26, at 341. The Supreme Court has stated: 'The gen-
eralized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713
(1974). Work product very rarely contains inculpatory evidence of illegal or
fraudulent activities or the only direct proof on a principal issue, but the possi-
bility remains that overriding considerations of policy may dictate an exception
to the strict immunity given opinion work product. As was recently explained
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit:
In our view, opinion work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity
and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circum-
stances.... Our unwillingness to recognize an absolute immunity for
opinion work product stems from the concern that there may be rare
situations, yet unencountered by this court, where weighty considera-
tions of public policy and a proper administration of justice would mili-
tate against the non-discovery of an attorney's mental impressions.
In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) (citation and footnote omitted).
Under normal circumstances and in conventional proceedings, however, policy
considerations underlying the need for protection of opinion work product will
be paramount.
60. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 49 U.SJL.W. 4093, 4096-97 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1981). As the Bonnell court notes, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Upjohn the circuit courts were split on the question of whether a work product
defense could be asserted in an IRS summons enforcement proceeding. 483 F.
Supp. at 1079.
61. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
62. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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vestigations.63 Indeed, by virtue of this authority, the IRS pos-
sessed the requisite investigatory power to compel Cargill to
release any unprivileged information that related to Cargill's
potential tax liability.6 4 Thus in Bonnell, the IRS' use of the
attorney's opinion work product was not necessary for its in-
vestigation of, or determination of potential claims against, Car-
gill.
Balanced against the government's need for the summoned
material is the taxpayer's interest in the evidence sought to be
suppressed. In many cases this interest is largely personal to
the individual taxpayer and an order for suppression is not ap-
propriate. But where, as in Bonnell, the summonses are based
on privileged opinion work product that has been seized with-
out authorization by a private party,65 far broader policy con-
63. The language of section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code is quite
broad, providing that "the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-(1) To ex-
amine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or mate-
rial to such inquiry .... ." I.R.C. § 7602. Citing this sweeping language, the
Bonnell court noted that "[tihe IRS' power is arguably even greater than that
of other administrative agencies. .. ." 483 F. Supp. at 1079. Other courts have
similarly acknowledged the broad investigative authority given the IRS under
section 7602. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 56-58 (1964); United
States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 619 (10th Cir. 1977). Indeed, when
one aggrieved taxpayer challenged an IRS summons by characterizing it as a
"fishing expedition," the Eighth Circuit replied that the IRS had been "specifi-
cally licensed to fish by § 7602." United States v. Girodano, 419 F.2d 564, 568
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970). Nonetheless, the IRS' investi-
gatory powers are not absolute, and statutory provisions for judicial enforce-
ment of IRS summonses stand as the principal restraint against abuse of the
summons procedure. See note 3 supra.
64. The IRS is given broad summons authority by statute. See note 62
supra. In assessing the proper scope of this authority, the Supreme Court has
established permissive guidelines. To warrant judicial enforcement, a proposed
IRS investigation must meet four requirements: first, a legitimate purpose
must underlie the investigation; second, the inquiry must be relevant to that
purpose; third, the information sought must not already be in the IRS' posses-
sion; and fourth, proper administrative provisions under the Code must have
been followed. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). Under this
broad grant of investigatory power, the IRS had the authority to obtain,
through administrative summons, any unprivileged information Cargill pos-
sessed relevant to Cargill's potential tax liability. That the IRS had such au-
thority is evidenced by the fact that, prior to the IRS issuance of summonses in
Bonnell, Cargill had employed a trial attorney to prepare for the eventuality of
such inquiries.
65. Because it involved the unique circumstance of a private seizure of
opinion work product by a third party not before the court, the precedential ef-
fect of the holding in Bonnell can be minimized if confined to its facts. Restrict-
ing the IRS' use of opinion work product to such extraordinary circumstances
would not have an appreciable inhibiting effect on attorneys preparing for pos-
sible tax litigation. On the other hand, the unique fact situation, standing
alone, is hardly a compelling justification for allowing the IRS use of opinion
,work product. This is particularly true when one considers both the policies
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siderations are relevant. As noted earlier,6 6 when one attorney
is permitted to use the legal theories and strategies of his or
her opponent, the opponent may be discouraged from engaging
in written preparation or from exerting his or her best efforts.
Similarly, an attorney who has the benefit of an opponent's
trial strategies and legal theories may feel relieved of the bur-
den of independently exerting his or her own best efforts. Fi-
nally, clients who know that materials comprising their
attorneys' trial preparation may be used by an opposing party
may be discouraged from revealing unfavorable but essential
facts to their counsel. Thus, allowing expanded use of opinion
work product contravenes the principle underlying the adver-
sary system: vigorous and independent preparation.67
The Bonnell court's use of a balancing test to resolve these
competing interests increases the uncertainty concerning work
product protection. Although the competing policy considera-
tions are clear, and although the use of such a test might en-
courage courts to articulate more concisely the policy choices
underlying their analyses, this case-by-case approach also vests
considerable discretion at the trial court level and will inevita-
bly lead to inconsistent results. Such inconsistency is particu-
larly inappropriate when used to determine the scope and
integrity of privileged materials, because an effective privilege
requires the certainty that only consistent protective treatment
can provide.68
Strictly prohibiting the use of opinion work product by an
opposing party, whether such use is sought in the course of
pre-trial discovery or in the course of an IRS investigation,
would be a better approach. By preventing one party from us-
ing its opponent's thoughts and trial strategies, a court would
be advancing the value of independent preparation-so central
underlying the work product doctrine and the other options the IRS possesses
to gain information regarding potential tax liability. The Bonnell court, how-
ever, gave no indication that its refusal to protect the fruits of work product
was limited to the unique facts at issue. Thus, Bonnell might be used as prece-
dent to restrict further the scope of the protections afforded work product.
66. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
67. Courts often have noted that the attorney's need for protection of work
product outweighs the public's need for the information. See note 14 supra for
cases in which work product has been protected in the context of grand jury
proceedings. One observer has stated that "the foundation of a healthy, truth-
ascertaining adversary legal system requires a strong adherence to the policy
of protection of the 'lawyer's work product."' Kane, The Work Product Doc-
trine-Cornerstone of the Adversary System, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 130, 130 (1964).
See also text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
68. See Note, supra note 26, at 344-45.
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to the adversary system. Specific, limited exceptions to this
blanket immunity would be recognized when the need for pro-
duction was unusually compelling.6 9 The Supreme Court has
recently adopted this position in Upjohn Co. v. United States,70
holding the work product defense can be asserted as protection
against an IRS summons. Further, the Court found that to
overcome this defense something more than a "showing of sub-
stantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without un-
due hardship"71 is required. If the Bonnell court had adopted
this approach, it is unlikely that the court would have allowed
the derivative use of the attorney's memorandum.72 The IRS
did not argue that any unusual circumstances of particular
need existed for the document's use. The Service merely con-
tended that the document's private seizure eliminated any rea-
son for the application of an exclusionary rule.7 3
Although the Bonnell court correctly noted that the appli-
cation of an exclusionary rule under the unique facts presented
would not be likely to provide the desired deterrent effect upon
private seizures,74 the court failed to consider the beneficial ef-
fects that an order for suppression would have had on the pro-
bity of attorneys' opinion work product, and thus on the legal
profession and the adversary system generally.7 5 In this re-
spect, the application of an exclusionary rule would have done
far more than advance a limited deterrent function. In refusing
to apply an exclusionary rule to the fruits of work product, the
Bonnell court decided that "the societal interest in enforce-
ment of the nation's revenue laws"7 6 outweighed the individ-
ual's interest in the work product privilege. Although the
court's refusal to recognize a work product fruits defense in a
tax summons enforcement proceeding appears consistent with
the Supreme Court's general disfavor of exclusionary rules, 7 7
69. See note 59 supra.
70. 49 U.S.L.W. 4093 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981).
71. Id. at 4098.
72. See notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text.
73. See 483 F. Supp. at 1078 n.14.
74. 483 F. Supp. at 1081. Because private individuals are less likely than
government agents to have knowledge of the exclusionary rule, or even to have
evidentiary use as an objective of their search, it is apparent that the applica-
tion of an exclusionary rule to unauthorized private seizures would not be jus-
tified solely on a deterrence rationale.
75. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
76. The full quote is as follows: "But to the extent that a work-product
fruits defense would hinder this investigation and preclude the discovery of rel-
evant information, a substantial cost would be imposed on the societal interest
in enforcement of the nation's revenue laws." 483 F. Supp. at 1082.
77. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
1981]
504 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:488
the Bonnell court's holding, if not confined to the specific facts
of the case, gives the legal profession proper cause for concern.
Increased access to opinion work product can only serve to im-
pair an attorney's ability to function with independence and in-
tegrity as an advocate in an adversary system.
